Many theoretical frameworks assume that increasing organizational experience will produce convergence in problems, outcomes, and activities. In this paper, we present three curiosities from field research in which increasing experience apparently generated more, not less, variability. We suggest that under plausible and even mundane conditions, experience can systematically generate variability. We describe three specific conditions:
A casual reader of theoretical and empirical research on organizational systems might easily conclude that the more experience such a system has, the more its problems, outcomes, and activities will converge. Problem solving will become standardized, external problems will be channeled and codified, and both external and internal problems will become routine. Performance and associated problems will become less varied as the organization hones in on valuable strategies and activities. Activities will be repeated, often selectively, reducing their variability. Although it is easy to construct abstract models in which variability reduction does not occur, research in many traditions seems to assume that with greater experience, an organizational system's behavior or results will show reduced variation over time. The same vision often appears in accounts of how industry-level or regional experience influences patterns of problems, outcomes, and activities.
In this paper, we first offer brief evidence supporting the idea that many literatures imply or actually claim that experience will tend to produce convergence in organization-related settings. We then offer three curious findings from our own and others' work in which experience fails to reduce variability and even enhances it, although we might not have expected it to do so. We offer brief comments on each. In the Discussion section we reflect on three generic situations in which experience in a system is likely to enhance variability, the processes that produce this variability, and factors that may enhance or detract from their impact.
We consider two major types of variability in our work. With uni-dimensional variability, problems, outcomes and actions vary in terms of their level or position on a single scale or dimension (March, 1991) . Two populations of firms may differ in terms of how much they vary in their member's return on investment, for example. Variability in salary levels may be higher in one occupation than in another. Variability can be considered across groups at a given point in time, or can be considered across time for an individual entity. An array of measures has been used to measure such variability, including absolute measures like range and variance, and relative variability measures like coefficient of variation, Gini co-efficient or Theils' index (Allison, 1978; Bedeian and Mossholder, 2000) . Different conceptualizations are implicit in these different measures, but all involve variability along a single dimension of activity or outcome.
The second type of variability is what we call categorical variability. With categorical variability there are differences in the numbers of dimensions in a focal object (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000) , or in the types and distributions of categorical entities. For example, one set of organizations might reveal more distinct occupational categories, practices, and routines than another. One population of organizations may display a wider array of collective practices, organizational types, or organizational routines than does another population. Comparisons can be made between groups of organizations in terms of the degree of such variability, or over time for a single organization or population of organizations. More broadly, any social entity or set of activities may have more or less variability than others in terms of the number of distinct features, dimensions, or categorical identities present. This type of variability is intuitively close to the constructs of heterogeneity or diversity, which also offer an array of potential measures and indexes (e.g. Blau, 1977) . We discuss one example of unidimensional variability (movie project performance) and two examples of categorical variability (airline accidents and alliance types) in the cases that follow.
Experience and Convergence
Several bodies of work on organizations argue that generalized inertia and momentum play a strong role in organizations. This in turn implies that experience will not increase variability in activities. Early micro-institutional theorists Berger and Luckman (1967) tried to parse out specific sub-processes through which organizational experience generates routinization, focusing on how variation is reduced. Later theorists proposed that activities tend to be repeated because of threat-rigidity effects (Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton, 1981) , or escalation of commitment processes (Staw and Ross, 1989 ). Miller and Friesen (1980) presented more general arguments that organizations show momentum in repeating prior actions. Amburgey and Miner (1992:336) argued and presented evidence that the development of both organizational competencies and cognitive frameworks can produce "repetitive momentum" -defined as occurring when an organization's taking an action increases the chances it will do so again. Finally, Baum et al. (2000) cite eleven studies they believe show that the more experience an organization's members have with a particular activity, the more they are likely to repeat it (Baum, Li and Usher, 2000) .
Simple repetition implies that an organization will not increase its variability in behavior, but does not necessarily imply that convergence will occur. But theories that emphasize selective retention of actions or routines often imply true convergence over time. In simple behavioral models of trial-and-error learning, prior actions are repeated, but only those that apparently generated fruitful outcomes Olsen, 1976, Van de Ven and Polley, 1992) . Through such selective processes, ongoing experience generates convergence to a subset of more valued routines, actions, or performance outcomes. Behavioral learning theory adds the notion of adaptive organizational aspirations, and posits that aspirations and actions adjust to each other (Cyert and March, 1992 (1963) . This also implies that experience will reduce variability in behavior and in outcomes. This vision pervades much work on organizational learning. The idea that organizations will generally tend towards exploitive learning (March, 1991) , and that this involves reduced variability, often appears as a taken-for-granted assumption in this work. Large-scale empirical studies of organizational learning focus primarily on changes in the levels of performance in a system rather than on whether or not experience alters variability in performance or activities, so that we cannot yet turn to a systematic body of empirical work to sustain or refute this widespread assumption.
At higher levels of analysis, much early neo-institutional theory implied that organizational and industry-level experience produces social norms and cognitive maps that can in turn reduce variability in action and outcomes (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Porac et al., 1995) . Institutional theories have also emphasized how organizations will become more isomorphic with each other and with their environments over time (Scott, 2001 ). Coercive, mimetic, and normative processes, for example, can lead systems to end up converging on a small set of stable practices, because organizations become more similar by imitating each other, or by conforming to uniform societal pressures for doing certain activities and not others (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) . More broadly, rigidity and convergence to homogeneous practices are often envisioned in entire industries or regions, as when industry rules or political structures form and are assumed to be stable and highly resistant to change (Aldrich, 1999) .
Additionally, evolutionary frameworks typically assume that experience at several levels of analysis combines with key selection processes to move systems from initial variation to later convergence. Some of this work stresses internal selection processes (Burgelman, 1983; Miner, 1989; Baum and Singh, 1994) . Other work stresses variation, selection, and retention of activities across populations and communities of organizations (Baum and Singh, 1994; Aldrich, 1999) . The substantial body of research on technological evolution explicates how industry experience leads to the creation of technological compatibility standards, safety standards, and dominant designs (Tushman and Anderson, 1986) , all of which reduce future variability in designs and associated activities. Individual firms may also move towards more consistent manufacturing and production processes, reducing internal variability in activities.
Looking beyond organization theory, we see a wide body of work that mirrors the assumption of an experience-convergence link. For example, many traditional economic models assume that competition will drive a population to enact a narrow band of optimal activities (Wellmann, 1988) . Sociological and political science scholars offer accounts of the stability of social structure, and how potentially varied behavior is shaped over time so that it tends to between narrower boundaries of social norms, codes, or laws (Wellman, 1988) . Finally, there are increasingly nuanced formal models that explicate how lower-level activity can generate path-dependent lock-in processes which produce convergence in actions or outcomes over time (Arthur, 1989; Noda and Collis, 2001 ).
Viewed in this light, many important debates in organization theory can be seen as disagreements about which specific mechanisms account for why experience produces convergence in problems, outcomes and actions. They are not disagreements about whether the convergence occurs at all. For example, early contrasts between institutional and learning theories were around the issue of whether the movement to a smaller set of practices arose from sensible responses to different technical outcomes, or from less instrumental processes (Miner and Haunschild, 1995; Scott, 2001 ). These important debates -for there can be no doubt such constancies remain vital issues for social theory -may implicitly reinforce the pervasive assumption that organizational experience actually does in fact typically produce reduced variation. In the following section, we present three apparent exceptions to this tendency, drawn from varied sources, and speculate on processes that might produce them. In our Discussion, we hone in on three specific contexts where experience may systematically generate variability.
THREE CURIOSITIES
Curiosity #1: Causal Complexity in Accidents in the Airline Industry Haunschild and Sullivan (2002) studied the effects of causal heterogeneity on learning by U.S. commercial airlines, using data on all 1,808 accidents and incidents reported for 310 commercial airlines from 1983-1997. Their original study focused on whether the firms learned from different aspects of their own accident experience, or from industry-level experience. One important finding was that over the long haul (1957 through 1996) the number of accidents per 100,000 flight hours has decreased with increasing cumulative industry experience. Experience, then, generated fewer accidents. Stated more generally: increasing experience by an adaptive system generated a higher level of performance, consistent with many theories of learning.
In related work in progress, we have begun to explore the degree of heterogeneity or variation in the causes of accidents in the industry. The prior study distinguishes causally heterogeneous from causally homogeneous accidents. As an example of the former, one accident involved a combination of (1) a group of birds flying into one engine, causing a compressor stall, (2) an improperly aborted takeoff, (3) an attendant ordering a passenger evacuation without informing the pilot or the other attendants, or locating the suspected but nonexistent fire, and (4) the airline's failure to train some of their flight crews (Haunschild and Sullivan, 2002) . A contrasting causally homogenous accident occurred when a flight attendant was seriously injured after failing to follow the standard rules about precautions during turbulence. Learning models often posit that as performance improves (i.e., as fewer accidents occur), variability in performance also decreases (Argote, 1999) . Thompson (1967) highlighted the idea that organizations may channel, organize, and institutionalize initially varied flows of problems or clients.
Intuitively, it seems sensible that as the number of accidents is reduced, their variability might decrease as well. Figure 1 shows the contrasting evidence. This figure shows that the level of causal heterogeneity in the U.S. airline industry accidents has been increasing from 1983-1997. The data comes from construction of a heterogeneity index, which measures the heterogeneity of causes for each airline's accidents/incidents, averaged over all airlines for each year during the 1983-1997 period (see Haunschild and Sullivan, 2002 for details) . As many airlines have more than one accident/incident per year, the measure was constructed for both within-accident heterogeneity, and across-accident (airline level) heterogeneity. As can be seen in Figure 1 , both have been increasing over time.
This represents increasing categorical variability in problems.
It is not hard to come up with several plausible accounts of the origins of this increase in causal diversity in of airline accidents. One possibility is that an exogenous factor -technological complexity--may have been at work. The accidents may have become more diverse because of increases in the technical complexity of airplanes themselves, which is due in turn to increased reliance on complex information technology and internal systems. In this case, an exogenous change, unrelated to the airlines' own experience to date, may have generated the increased causal complexity in accidents.
On the other hand, the causal complexity in problems may not come from exogenous events, but be interwoven with the nature of the airlines' own direct prior experience. One possibility is that it may be that causally homogenous accidents may be easier to prevent than causally heterogeneous ones. Over time, what is likely to happen is that the easiest problems (the causally homogenous ones) will be dealt with first.
Airlines will learn from their own prior experience how to deal with the easy problems.
Then over time, only the difficult problems (the causally heterogeneous ones with complex interactions of multiple factors) will be what is left in the system. Our review of qualitative data on this particular industry suggests other, less obvious processes that may have played a key role in the increasing complexity or variability of accidents --the interaction of industry-level rules and ongoing organizational action. We develop this possibility as one important engine of variability in the Discussion section below. To summarize briefly, we note that industry level rules represent an important form of collective memory. Industry groups and government regulators review overall industry accident patterns -collective experience beyond any one airline -as a basis for generating new rules. The creation of new rules at the industry level, however, can also provide a new source of accidents. This can occur because the collective rules prevent organizations from the actions that produce simple accidents, and because new rules combined with old ones can generate more complex operating environments. We consider these processes in more detail along with factors that influence whether the interaction industry-level rules and experience enhances variability of outcomes.
Although they differ, all of the processes above would generate a material shift in the actual complexity of accidents over time. In contrast, it is also possible that as the industry gains experience, the sensitivity of the observers increases rather than the actual nature of accidents. Investigators and participants alike may develop more complex models of accidents and more effective procedures for probing multiple causes (Newell and Simon, 1972; Perrow, 1984; Klahr and Simon, 1999) . There can be different degrees of variability in mental maps and filters (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000) . Although this is not the main focus of our work here, we argue in our later conclusions that such mental maps may generate variability over time.
Curiosity #2: Project Performance in the U.S. Movie Industry
Schwab (2000) studied the impact of movie credits in a stratified random sample of (2001) explore how prior collaboration patterns influence collaboration in later projects, and whether a high degree of shared dyadic prior experience influenced the level and variability in performance of a future film.
Many standard learning assumptions would predict that prior joint experience leads to higher levels of future performance, and also to reduced variability in performance. Shared experience among subsets of team members should let teams develop and deploy successful practices and to avoid harmful interactions (March, 1991) . The prior observation of individual capabilities and of the capabilities of combinations of project participants could lead both participants and studio executives to predict and create more effective combinations of participants (Schwab and Miner, 2001 ). Participants should also be able to reduce downside risk by avoiding actions that proved harmful in the past, thus reducing variability (Greve, 1998) . Table 1 shows results for the impact of prior collaboration on levels and variance in project performance in a random sample of A-level movies. We examined two measures of performance: Box office revenues and Academy Award nominations. The table shows that shared experience was associated with higher box office revenues and with a higher number of Academy Award nominations in this sample, but that the difference is not statistically significant at the .05 level (although marginally significant for the Academy Awards). The data and visual inspection of simple scattergrams, however, suggest that performance variance in this population of projects did not go down with experience. In fact, Table 1 shows a significantly higher variance in both box office revenues and Academy award nominations for teams with more prior collaborations. This is a case of increasing unidimensional variability in outcomes. Table 1 About Here
What social processes might underlie increasing variability in these performance outcomes? One possibility is that high levels of prior experience has a psychological effectleading to increased confidence and taking on more risky projects, although research on the threat-rigidity effects implies that confidence might not necessarily increase variability (Staw et al., 1981) . Another possibility comes from Faulkner and Anderson's (1987) study of careers of producers, directors and cinematographers in the U.S. movie industry from [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] . Faulker and Anderson's discussion suggests that reduced levels of studio control over projects could have unleashed more variability. Seasoned directors and their teams were sometimes permitted more latitude to experiment and pursue artistic goals (Powdermaker, 1951) . In this process, loosening of an external factor -studio control of projects -could release pre-existing tendencies for variability.
We develop in our Discussion section two other important potential sources for increased variability more closely related to the impact of ongoing experience itself. First is the fact that the movie industry is an industry whose competitive rules of the game sometimes emphasize novelty for its own sake, and also getting "home-runs" or extremely high outcomes (March, 1991) . While historians emphasize the dominant role of commercial success in this era of movies as well as others, they also emphasize the tension with movies as an artistic creation. In the artistic domain, moviemakers sought to create novel and newworld type productions for their own sake (Powdermaker, 1951) . To the degree that an implicit measure of performance value may be novelty itself, teams with more experience might actively seek novelty. As novelty is risky and likely to produce either big successes or big failures, a focus on novelty can provide an engine of variability in action and outcomes.
Competition in the movie industry can also create a situation that rewards the rare "home run" of extremely high value, rather than a pattern of sustained good performance among projects (Powdermaker, 1951) . This reward structure would encourage experienced teams to deliberately work on deliberately risky projects.
Second, experience may have created expertise, which in turn had an influence on variability and novelty. Simon's work on scientific discovery suggests that experienced collaborators develop expertise that in turn deepens several types of discovery capabilities (Klahr and Simon, 1999; 2001) . Greater team experience could generate the expertise that would permit discovery of new project ideas and opportunities, leading to greater variability in outcomes. We develop the above competitive structure and impact of expertise explanations more fully in our Discussion section.
Curiosity #3: Impact of Prior Collaborations on Future Collaboration
Our first two curiosities involved variability across projects and within industry patterns over time. As noted earlier, theorists also tend to assume that experience within an organization will reduce the variability in its activities and outcomes. Amburgey and Miner's (1992) study, for example, found some support for "repetitive momentum" in which the number of prior mergers of a specific type influenced the propensity to execute that type of merger in the future (e.g. product extension, conglomerate, market extension, or vertical merger). They also found some support for "contextual momentum" in which decentralization increased the chances of product extension and conglomerate mergers. In these cases, organizational experience appeared to reduce the sphere of action to a more consistent pattern of merger and acquisition activity.
If we apply this logic to alliances, momentum research (Miller and Friesen, 1980; Baum et al., 2000) implies that if a firm has had experience with one type of strategic alliance in the past, it should tend to have more alliances of that specific type at a later time. The existence of routines, simple momentum, the development of related competencies and cognitive frames through experience, the impact of restricted information flows and even the evolution of political truces should generate this result. Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) argue further that prior collaborations change the populationlevel network structure and an organization's position in the network, leading to an increasingly restricted set of potential partners over time.
As our third curiosity, we offer Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr (1996) 's findings about collaboration in the biotechnology industry, which provide contradictory evidence.
Powell et al. examined the impact of prior experience in research and development alliances on (1) the number of subsequent R&D alliances, (2) the number of alliances of other types, and (3) network portfolio diversity at a later time. Other types of alliances (outside research and development alliances) included clinical trials and evaluation, manufacturing, marketing/licensing, supply/distribution, and investment/joint venture alliances. These collaborations might occur with venture capital firms, research hospitals, pharmaceutical companies, universities, and with other biotechnology firms.
Although one might have concern about some aspects of the analytic strategy used, the paper presents reasonable evidence that R&D ties did not follow a pattern of repetitive momentum or convergence to increasingly restricted sets of ties. Instead, R&D ties apparently generated diversity in future ties (Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr 1996, p. 135) . The level of prior R&D ties appears to increase the propensity to form finance, marketing, clinical, investment, and supply ties in the future. Thus, prior R&D ties increased the measure of future tie diversity. This measure was computed for each year using an index of diversity quite similar to Blau's index of heterogeneity, based on the eight different potential types of ties. The number of R&D ties in a prior period increased the diversity measure in the later period. Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr (1996, p. 38) conclude that "R&D ties, directly and through increased experience, enable firms to access more diverse sources of collaboration." This curiosity, then, like the airline accidents, embodies increasing categorical variability, but in this case it is variability in activities rather than problems.
Powell et al. explain this effect in terms of the expanded horizons and awareness of new projects that come from having R&D ties. In a young single product firm, one might also imagine that more varied ties would follow an R&D alliance because successful R&D work creates products. Alliances for manufacturing or marketing would have more value after that point (Teece, 1987) . We develop in our Discussion section the alternative notion that repeated vicarious learning by these organizations helps generate the increasing variety of alliances. Firms in R&D alliances are actively involved in scientific and industry-wide search activities that make them aware of activities and outcomes of varied firms. This permits them to repeatedly observe, imitate, or draw inferences about collaboration activities by these other firms. We consider how imperfect imitation, use of multiple models, and ambiguity about the value of different collaboration modes, could generate more rather than fewer types of collaboration by a focal firm.
DISCUSSION
A clever formal modeler can easily generate many hypothetical processes in which increasing experience will produce variability of problems, activities, and outcomes. Even the patterns found in our three specific cases suggest multiple processes behind each. From the many potential processes we have picked three to explore in more detail below. The contexts and processes we focus on are not exotic. They may even appear somewhat mundane, suggesting that they play a nonobvious and nontrivial role in organizational life. At the same time, the processes at work are consistent with the curiosities described above, with qualitative data concerning their contexts, and with broader literatures linked to problems, performance outcomes, and activities. The three generic situations do not represent an exhaustive and mutually exclusive catalogue of the ways that experience can generate variability, and we see substantial work needed to improve their precision. Nonetheless, we hope that speculation on their potential existence and impact opens the door to more structured conversations about when and how experience systematically enhances variability.
The organization of the rest of this paper is as follows. We start by outlining each situation and related processes in some detail. We present early ideas about how experience generates variability in this context. For each class of processes, we also note the levels at which it might be expected to operate. Some processes occur at the level of the organization, increasing an organization's own variability in problems, outcomes or activities. Some processes occur at higher (collective) levels, increasing the variability seen in the collectivity as a whole. Some processes involve the interaction of organizational and population level factors. Finally, for each engine we speculate on moderating effects: what conditions might strengthen or weaken the variability generating processes.
Because the three main engines of variability we discuss are not exhaustive, we then briefly comment on other classes of candidates for processes in which experience may generate variability. We close by proposing that two important learning factors may have broader impact on the experience-variability link: whether learning is cognitive or behavioral, and whether experience is at the population or organizational level.
Throughout this work, we try to focus primarily on engines of variability that do not come from the unexpected impact of external shocks such as wars or technological disruptions (Tushman and Anderson, 1986) , but rather through the ordinary workings of the system itself. At the same time, we are interested in the creation of systematic variability, rather than in the simple decay of the system to some form of entropy.
Engine #1: The Interaction of Experience with Higher-Level Rules
Our first situation in which experience may generate increased variability involves the interaction of organizational and collective experience with higher-level rules, regulations and constraints. Although we think other processes may also be contributing to the increasing complexity of airline accidents, qualitative evidence suggests that the interaction of experience and higher-level rules may play an important role. The U.S. airline industry is heavily regulated by the FAA. The FAA regularly produces and updates rules regarding all aspects of airline and airway safety. Some rules are new, and some are modifications or substitutions of existing rules. The proliferation of new rules might plausibly be related to the increasing heterogeneity of accident causes over time through two distinct processes.
First, to the extent that rules can help airlines correct problems that might otherwise have occurred, the diversity of accident causes might go up because the most common causes of accidents have been reduced through these rules (rather than through direct organizational experience), leaving the complex interactions of multiple causes and causes that have not yet occurred. For example, fairly simple weather-related accidents used to be more common than they are now, in part because there are now many rules regulating weather-related flying, e.g., plane de-icing. Reason (1987, p. 171) A second process whereby the interaction of organizational experience and rules might increase causal heterogeneity is suggested by noted accident scholars who argue that rules may actually increase accidents and create new types of errors. For example, as noted by Reason (1987) , rules designed to reduce the opportunities for one kind of error in a system can relocate errors to other parts of a system, like a knee brace that shifts stress to another part of the leg. And these relocated errors tend to be more opaque than prior errors. Perrow (1984:142) notes the increased complexity that can result from safety initiatives, and gives an example of an accident that occurred as a result of the unanticipated interactions that resulted from implementation of a new safety system.
Increasing causal complexity in this system, then, comes not from increasing exogenous technical complexity, but from complexity generated by the interaction of rules (constraints) and experience. Levels: Where do effects operate? This is a case where the crucial factors that operate to produce divergence are not solely at the organization level, as we are not dealing with organization rules, but rules that cover an entire industry. Divergence is created through an interaction of collective and organizational action and rules. The experience that generates the rules, of course, may be collective. The rules generated by governing bodies or alliances can have several sources: single salient events, collective experience, and copying rules from other populations.
Using the airline industry as an example, rules are sometimes generated in response to a single large, very salient problem. The FAA rules governing airport security in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. is one example of this type of rule. On the other hand, governing bodies also generate rules based on the collective problems or experiences of the organizations under their jurisdiction. For example, Perrow (1984) discusses a NTSB-generated safety recommendation regarding pressure/vacuum pumps that operate gyroscopes and altitude indicators. The NTSB cites evidence from several accidents that were caused by gyroscope/altitude problems (NTSB AAR-81-14, 1981) , and indicate they used this collective experience of the industry as a source of rule generation.
Finally, governing bodies sometimes generate rules by observing and copying or adapting the rules of another population or industry group. For example, regulators, in deciding whether and how to regulate and report medical errors, are using the FAA rules and regulations system as a model, and individuals have copied airline industry accident investigation methods to investigate medical errors (Gawande, 2002) . In the last two cases, we clearly see how rules are generated as a result of collective, rather than individual, experience.
In this case, then, the total process generating variability involves the interaction of organizational and population level experience over time.
Moderators: Convergence or divergence?
What factors influence when the interaction of experience and rules tends to increase or decrease variability in problems and outcomes? One line of reasoning implies that the variability (divergence) effect will be stronger when new rules are added without dropping old rules. The reason for this is new rules present more potential opportunities for problems of the sort noted by Reason (1997) and Perrow (1984) -relocating problems to other parts of the system, increasing complexity of accident causes. This would imply that convergence, rather than divergence, could arise when rules are deleted from the system, as rules complexity should decrease in this case. On the other hand, the new rules still provide a new landscape for organizational experience, so that the variability of outcomes may still be higher than before the new rules were added.
A second line of reasoning implies the degree of interdependence between different factors in the causal landscape in which the organizations operate may also moderate how the interaction of rules and experience influences variability (Levinthal, 1997) . If there are strong interaction effects between the outcomes of different activities, 
Engine #2: Experience in Novelty or Top-Score Competitive Systems
Many literatures have assumed that competition will not only tend to produce convergence, but that this convergence will be towards a more efficient or effective set of activities. Bad practices will be weeded out; good ones will dominate. This notion may be developed in formal models, or appear in informal theorizing as a taken-for-granted assumption. It is a feature of enduring models in both the social and the biological sciences (March, 1994) .
At the same time, some important theory points to conditions under which competition may generate variability (Hayek, 1968) . In many cases, this work emphasizes the impact of external shocks or jolts to the focal system. Both biologists and social scientists for example have found evidence of "competitive release," where the removal of a major constraint leads to later variability (Orzack and Sober, 2001; Barnett, 1995 Barnett, , 1996 . In contrast, we are especially interested in cases in which no external shock occurs, but in which variability arises out of ordinary experience within an ongoing competitive system. Two types of competitive systems and related processes stand out on this dimension.
Competition around novelty.
In some systems, novelty may serve as an important performance metric (March, 1991) . We suggested above this occurs in some parts of the movie industry. It is likely to occur in other industries as well. For example, Leblebici et al (1991) describe lively instances in which competition in the radio industry involved novelty generation, e.g., the rise of the role of the radio "personality" (DJ) during the 1960s. In these cases, experience appeared to increase variability in activities for some period of time. Performance by non-profit music, theater, art organizations, and even social movements may also be measured in terms of the degree of novelty that is rewarded. Additionally, assuming some base level of quality, some scientific organizations compete on the novelty of their productions (March, 1999) . Rura and Miner (2002) even found some evidence for novelty as performance criterion for the selection of internal organizational routines into the "normal workings of departments" in a bureaucracy that saw itself as being in a period crucial adaptation. Two of our curiosities involved contexts that reward novelty at least in some parts of their operation: the movie industry, and R&D alliances involving discovery and product development.
In a novelty-based competitive structure, instrumentally oriented organizations that are aware of this structure can try to increase effective novel productions. This creates a straightforward incentive effect. It is not in and of itself an argument for why higher levels of experience can generate more variability. It is, however, a context in which experience may be especially likely to enhance variability. Simon's extensive research on scientific discovery offers one mechanism through which experience may enhance individual, group or organizational ability to generate novelty in such systems.
Greater experience is likely to lead to higher levels of expertise (Klahr and Simon, 1999; 2001) . Experts, in turn, use tools related to their specific areas of expertise in pursuing discovery, but also use more universal techniques such as planning, hill climbing, and analogy (Newell and Simon, 1972) . The use of analogy is especially helpful at the frontiers of knowledge where problems are less well structured. Thus, for Simon, "expertness…is the prerequisite to creativity" (Simon, 1985, p. 12 ; see also Qin and Simon, 1990 ). Thus, novelty or variation (as an instance of creativity) is related to expertise, which is a function of experience in a specific domain (Simon, 1985) .
At the organizational level, some evidence supports the idea that organizations can draw on their own experience to develop capabilities that facilitate the creation of novel productions (Sutton and Hargadon, 1997; Miner, Bassoff and Moorman, 2001 ).
Internal selection processes can be tuned to retaining people and processes that have generated increased novelty. In the case of movies project, teams who have worked together before can develop shared expertise, which in turn would permit them to deploy expert tools in the creation of novel productions.
In addition to individual organizations sustaining novel activities and performances, some populations may consist of short-lived organizations that generate individual highly novel outcomes and are quickly replaced by other organizations that have produced a different novel production (Aldrich, 1999) . Thus, even though each organization's experience is brief, the overall level of experience of the population increases variability in activities. The important idea in these examples is that it is not just the incentive structure that sustains variability of actions and outcomes, but additional experience which makes possible increasing levels of novelty over time.
Competition on extreme values.
A related competitive structure occurs when winning requires having the single highest "score" in a distribution of performance (March, 1991) , i.e., the single highest score beats a good overall performance, consistent performance, or high average performance. Consider a soccer tournament in which the winner is the team with the highest single point differential (i.e., team goals minus competitor goals) in any game. In this system, the team that wins the highest number of games or scores the best average number of goals per game might not win the tournament. A team that lost all of its games but one could be the winner.
As March (1991) observes, this type of competitive structure could prompt organizations to undertake high risk activities, seeking the one big win, or could simply select organizations for survival that already tend to take high risks. Organizational or system-level experience within a top-score competitive structure could then increase variability in actions and outcomes. Organizations conscious of the system's structure could draw on their own or others' experience to cultivate and devote more resources to processes that seemed to have produced extreme outcomes in the past, could deliberately implement high-risk/high-payoff actions, and could implement new-to-the world activities, knowing that the expected value of each is low, but that they may also obtain that one extremely good outcome (March, 1991) . At the collective level, longer collective experience means more time for non-risk-seeking organizations to fail, leaving a higher proportion of organizations that produce highly variable activities and outcomes. Levels: Where do the effects operate? Our reasoning implies that both organization-level and population-level experience could help generate variability in actions and outcomes in a novelty or top-score competitive system. An organization's own experience can lead to increased novelty or extreme outcomes through the development of expertise that promotes novelty, or directly innovative capabilities. At the same time, some industries appear to generate ongoing variability with experience through the rapid birth and death of individual organizations each of which has a single or few highly novel or extreme organizational productions.
Some of the mechanisms we have indicated may be at work in the novelty based or top-score competitive systems involve focal actors who know about the rules of the game. They can deliberately seek to act in novel or extreme ways and to create new-tothe-world processes, performances, artifacts, and ideas. This mechanism differs from the processes we emphasized in the interaction of experience and rules or repeated imitation in a crucial way. In these other processes the creation of variability is an unintended outcome of other activities. Yet when organizations seek novelty, they deliberately create variability. This also differs from processes in which novelty arises from random mutations, slippages, imperfections in learning, or simple movement towards disorder or entropy. This in turn raises the question of whether artificial intelligence or biological metaphors that involve recombinations of existing actions can fully capture organizational processes that generate variability (Baum and Singh, 1994) .
Moderators: Convergence or divergence?
The above logic implies that the degree to which a competitive structure rewards novelty or extreme outcomes will increase the degree to which experience generates divergence (i.e., variability) in actions and outcomes. Our reasoning also implies that organizations may be able to develop higher-level competencies in generating novelty, or can sustain deliberate patterns of high-risk actions, even though these actions will lead on average to disastrous outcomes.
Factors that enhance the ability of organizations to develop or sustain such higher-level competencies in generating valued novelty would also be relevant.
Top-score organizational competitions may be easier to sustain when individual human participants within the competing organizations "belong" to some higher level entity -such as an industry -in which they have additional chances for later rounds of competition. If project participants in the movie industry anticipate future projects, they may be more willing to compete in a top-score competitive structure for individual movies. Schwab's (2000) research on the impact of movie credits provides some evidence consistent with this possibility.
One important rationale for why ongoing experience in adaptive systems will reduce variability is that organizations tend to repeat valued short-term outcomes (March, 1991; Rura and Miner, 2002) . This reasoning implies that organizations within novelty or top-score competitive systems may be able to sustain variability better if they have longer-term horizons, or are buffered from short term external demands. If organizations can protect their activities from incremental short-term competition while engaging in long-term novelty or high-score competitions, experience could be more likely to generate novelty. This is consistent with some rationales for systems such as tenure within research universities, where the provision of tenure gives researchers a chance to engage in longer-term, higher risk activities.
Our arguments here draw on elementary notions of the structure of a competitive system. Obviously theories of iterated games and related findings in experimental economics offer rich and more subtle models of competitive dynamics and factors that will influence how experience in the game shapes variability in action.
Engine #3: Repeated Vicarious Learning
Selective inter-organizational copying and vicarious learning can be an important force affecting variability in routines and activities in a population of organizations (Miner and Haunschild, 1995) . As organizations selectively copy or learn from the activities of other organizations (e.g. imitate practices seen as having fruitful outcomes or those associated with profitable firms), the balance of routines in the population can shift.
Intuitively it seems this should lead to convergence --and this assumption pervades much prior research. But a more careful look indicates that repeated vicarious learning could actually generate variability (Miner and Haunschild, 1995; Greve, 1996; Miner and Raghaven, 1999) . Miner and Raghavan (1999) review formal models and empirical research in several different literatures that reveal a surprising number of factors that can generate variability through interorganizational imitation. Three seem especially relevant in the situations we observed. First, as we suggested earlier in discussing the Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr (1996) study, if a focal organization uses several different organizations as models for the structure of alliance ties, it may end up with more diverse ties than any one of the models themselves has (Boyd and Richerson, 1985) . In addition, copying the activities of a particular model is not always perfect, and these imperfections introduce variation. For example, assume a firm wants to copy firm routine A, but in doing so produces a slight variation, e.g., routine A1 (Boyd and Richerson, 1985) --variation is produced through this process. Ambiguity in the true value of an activity carried out by other organizations can also make it difficult to assess whether an action by another organization has potential value, increasing the noise in imitation and learning. New bundles of practices may also arise when organizations use different vicarious learning modes in different areas of activity. For example, they may imitate the most frequent practice in one area of activity, but imitate practices of high status organizations in another (Haunschild and Miner, 1997 ). This will produce new combinations of activities not seen in other organizations. Organizations may develop cognitive ideas and models that they can use to create novel ideas and activities by watching others. All of these imitation processes will tend to produce divergence, rather than convergence over time.
In the curiosities described earlier repeated vicarious learning may be at work in the case of industry accidents when airlines attempt to learn from direct observation of other airlines, or from collective industry experience. Imperfections in vicarious learning from other airlines may produce variation in activities and outcomes. Although we have little direct evidence, it could also be at work within the biotechnology context studied by Powell et al. (1996) . The firms in R&D alliances are typically engaged in processes of discovery and search, making them aware of other firms in their industry. They have ample motives and opportunities to try to learn from these others. With each prior R&D alliance they can observe more closely some aspects of their partners' other alliances.
Multiple models, misunderstanding about the true nature of alliances by others, and the hard-to-assess value of alliances by others would mean that repeated vicarious learning could lead firms to create increasingly diverse alliances.
Several scholars have provided direct evidence that vicarious learning/imitation processes can result in a divergence in the routines, outcomes, and forms enacted in a population of organizations. Greve (1996) , for example, tests well-argued hypotheses concerning different types of inter-organizational mimetic behavior in the radio industry.
He shows interesting results for specific hypotheses about both the impact of firm-level heterogeneity and mimetic modes. The overall pattern of results indicates that repeated imitation and vicarious learning could generate diversity of practices. Greve (1996:55) reports that format diversity in the radio industry is not only considerable, but also appears to be increasing with industry experience, as new formats are created while old ones do not completely disappear. Formal models of the impact of various forms of imitation within repeated competitive games also support the vision of vicarious learning generating variability (e.g., Ginsberg, Lomi and Larson, 1999) .
Levels: Where do effects operate?
The processes through which vicarious learning results in variability can occur at either the organization level or the collective (population) level. At the organization level, repeated vicarious learning by an individual organization can increase the variability of its own actions if it uses multiple imitation rules and models, or actively uses observation of others to create new ideas for action.
These processes can in turn impact the distribution of routines, practices, and outcomes in a population (Miner and Haunschild, 1995) . Greater variability in activities and outcomes may occur at the level of the population as a whole. Repeated imperfect copying of the routines of one organization by others, for example, will increase the variety of routines in the population. Firms may also learn new ideas for novel action from collective experience. Beckman and Haunschild (2002) , for example, showed that variance in partner outcomes in firm networks influenced the behavior of focal firms.
This study leaves open the possibility of inferential learning from observing others. That is, the firms may observe activities and outcomes, draw inferences, and create new-tothe-world actions based on models or ideas derived from these observations. This in turn makes it possible for entirely new activities to appear in the population.
Moderators: Convergence or divergence? Intuitively, it seems most likely that repeated vicarious learning should lead to convergence of the practices. There are also situations under which oscillating patterns of movement from one dominant practice to another would be predicted. As we noted earlier, however, there are many situations under which repeated imitation can generate variability (divergence) rather than convergence (Miner and Raghaven, 1999) . This can occur even when the imitation rule is to copy the most frequent practice in the population. In general, features of the imitators (e.g., preferences for certain learning models, risk aversion, goal certainty), features of the models (e.g., clarity of the routine to be adopted), features of the process by which the imitator learns from the model (e.g., learning errors, rules of search, ordering effects), and the structure of the imitation context (e.g., degree of shared communication among imitators) can all influence whether repeated imitation or vicarious learning will generate variability in practices. Narduzzo and Warglien, (1996) , for example, provide an interesting experimental study which indicates that the use of different individual-level selective imitation rules can influence whether convergence or some level of variability emerges over time.
The degree of "localness" of interaction can also moderate experience's impact on variability. This can be seen in various simulation models (e.g., Ginsberg, Lomi and Larson, 1999) . A related case study by Anderson (1999) portrays oscillation over time influenced in part by the interaction of vicarious learning with geographic distance. He describes how the main technology for cement mixing changed from dry to wet and back again to dry, due in part to shifting neighborhoods of vicarious learning between firms over time. Localized competition drove firms to imitate the practices of nearby rivals, which left pockets of variation -even when the majority of firms had converged on a single routine. These pockets then produced a superior routine, which was, in turn, slowly adopted by the majority through vicarious learning processes.
Finally, competitive processes play a crucial moderating role on the impact of vicarious learning. Greve's 1996 study envisions some processes in which the specific combination of mimetic and competitive processes ends up generating variability in activities in the population of radio stations. It is interesting to note that Greve's work implies that the interaction of two processes typically assumed to generate convergence (competition and imitation) actually produces variability in activities and outcomes in this case.
Additional Engines of Systematic Variability.
We have dwelled on the three engines above because our curiosities suggested them, some prior research supported them, and they seemed plausible and potentially widespread. Two of the processes that we note -higher level rules and vicarious learning -call up automatic images of convergence, as does competition in many cases. Yet more careful inspection reveals they can be engines of divergence. Clearly it's possible to find other engines of systematic variability in the literature and through reflection on organizational processes. We have noted some in our comments on the three curiosities, but have left many areas for further exploration.
For example, Levinthal (1991) explores formal models of population compositional change, emphasizing how founding stock may influence eventual variation in the organizations remaining. His work underscores that organizational heterogeneity may emerge from selection on key traits, but may emerge stochastically over time as well (1991: 418). As we noted above, more sophisticated game-theoretic and agent-based models offer additional candidates for theorizing about variability. Additionally, although we have tried to avoid processes that involve major external shocks such as theories of punctuated change (e.g., Tushman and Anderson 1986) , some of the processes we describe may involve organizational encounters with novel stimuli and activities during ongoing experience. March (1999, p. 131) notes the potential impact of organizations' deliberately adopting disruptive new technologies by observing that: "Some learning processes increase both average performance and variability. … If a new technology is so clearly superior as to overcome disadvantages of unfamiliarity with it, it will offer a higher expected value than the old technology. At the same time, the limited experience with the new technology (relative to experience with the old) will lead to increased variance. A similar result might be expected with the introduction of a new body of knowledge, or new elements of culture diversity to an organization …" (italics added for emphasis). Thus, including experience with dramatic external shocks and unexpected exogenous change, which we did not directly address, opens the door to other groups of processes that are already an important part of organization theory.
Finally, we note that our study has not pursued the question of forces that increased the degree of perceived (rather than actual) variability over time. This was one of our candidates for why reported accidents became more complex. It offers a distinct frontier for theorizing about the link of experience with variability.
Generic Moderators of Experience-Variability Link.
As we worked through specific moderators in the three situations above, we wondered whether there are more generic, broad factors that will enhance the chances that experience will generate variability. We offer two: one related to the type of learning that was generated through experience, and the other to the level of learning that was involved.
First, we note that organizational processes involving the impact of experience can be divided into two fundamental sorts. In some cases, experience has a direct impact through its consequences, or through selection of subset of activities, but the "memory" consists only of the ongoing activities themselves. Simple behavioral repetition of successful actions and deletion of harmful ones embodies such a process. In other situations, there is a separate recording device related to prior experience -such as the creation of mental models, where experience is encoded into a cognitive or artifactual representation (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000) . Behavioral learning exemplifies the first type of process and cognitive learning embodies the second.
Cognitive learning is more likely than behavioral learning to enhance the chances that experience will generate variability. The potential for variability from experience is potentially enhanced if there are mental representations of activities and experience, due to the presence of multiple possible representations for any given object. Thus, mental representations and cognitive processes permit organizations to deliberately create novel actions not represented in existing behaviors, to devise actions distinct from competitors, to create new-to-the-world ideas and activities for their own sake, and to derive novel ideas from watching others. We suggest, then, that experience coupled with representational (cognitive) learning can and will generate more variability, all else being equal, than behavioral learning systems alone will.
Second, we suspect that differences between levels of learning will also influence the experience-variability link. We speculate that conditions that increase the chances that experience will generate variability occur more often or more easily within populations than within individual organizations. Novelty-based and top-score competitive structures may be harder to sustain within organizations than across a population of organizations because of inertial pressures and pressures for exploitation rather than exploration (March, 1991) . The interactions we describe between higher-level rules and experience may also be more likely when the rules are at a population level, as the rules themselves will be more heterogeneous by virtue of the fact that they have been generated from population-level (or cross-population) experiences. Variability generated through repeated vicarious learning within an individual organization may be more likely to be detected and deliberately homogenized in the interests of equity and consistency than variability at the population level will. Future research that more systematically argues and empirically examines the idea that experience will be more likely to generate variability in populations would be valuable.
CONCLUSION
Throughout this paper, we have focused on variation or variability as an important outcome. In general, there has been little work looking at variation or variability as an outcome of various processes. We think this may be because of a general assumption that variation is random, i.e. it represents the "error term" in our models of systems. Such thinking is likely to consign the study of variation to unimportant, remote corners of inquiry. In this study, however, we have attempted to show that variation arises from several systematic sources, including the proliferation of rules, imperfect trial-and-error learning processes, and the rewarding of novelty. We hope that this will produce more interest in studying variation for it's own sake.
Many disciplines have embraced the idea that organizational experience leads to optimal outcomes, especially under competition. Many functionalist theories have envisioned that institutional practices converge to stable structures and norms through a variety of social processes. Over time, many disciplines have relaxed the assumption that convergence leads to optimal outcomes or to any specific equilibrium. Nonetheless, many seemingly competing theories still primarily argue about different ways experience generates convergence to a more limited sets of problems, outcomes, and activities rather than on whether and when experience produces convergence or variability.
Within the scholarly learning and adaptation literature, the functionalist flavor of prior theorists has been successfully rejected. We do not assume learning and adaptive processes will necessary produce good outcomes, or that it is even possible to find universal strategies that can sustain such outcomes (Levinthal and March, 1993) .
Learners interact with other learners; competitors interact with other competitors (March, 1991) . Researchers develop increasingly subtle theories about the conditions under which learning and adaptation will and will not generate short-term or long-term survival, prosperity or value.
In contrast, the idea that organizations and related systems will tend to move towards more restricted activities or outcomes seems to have gained acceptance as a universal pattern. It has become a taken-for-granted notion in much of the learning and adaptation literature, although there does not appear to be a corresponding body of systematic empirical research. Our encounters with three curiosities provoked us to notice this assumption and think harder about possible exceptions, as well as moderators of when such systematic variability will occur. We have cast a very wide net in doing so.
We have some trepidation that our activities have produced excessive variability in the examples and reasoning in our own paper. Some of our experience suggests that forcing more convergence in our own paper to a narrower set of ideas would have generated a more attractive intellectual outcome to our collective effort. On the other hand, perhaps not. 5 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
